Contact
Department of Economics
National University of Singapore
1 Arts Link, Singapore 117570
Phone: (65) 6516-6026
Fax: (65) 6775-2646
Email: ecsljf@nus.edu.sg
National University of Singapore
1 Arts Link, Singapore 117570
Phone: (65) 6516-6026
Fax: (65) 6775-2646
Email: ecsljf@nus.edu.sg
CURRICULUM VITAE
Editorial Boards
Associate Editor, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, from July 2015.
Associate Editor, Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, from 2016.
Associate Editor, Singapore Economic Review, Oct. 2010 - Sep. 2014.
Associate Editor, Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, from 2016.
Associate Editor, Singapore Economic Review, Oct. 2010 - Sep. 2014.
Publications
I. Auctions/Procurement:
Deposit Requirements in Auctions, with X. Che, T. Li, and X. Zheng, AEJ: Micro, 14(4), 465-493, 2022.
Perfect Bidder Collusion through Bribe and Request, with Z. Lu and C. Riis, Games and Economic Behavior, 129, 2021, 1-14.
Ex Ante Efficient Mechanism with Private Entry Costs, with X. Feng and Y. Sun, Economic Inquiry, 58(3), 2020, 1531-1541.
Pairing Provision Price and Default Remedy: Optimal Two-Stage Procurement with Hidden R&D Efficiency, with B. Liu, Rand Journal of Economics, 49(3), 619-655, 2018.
Ranking Disclosure Policies in All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information, with Hongkun Ma and Zhe Wang, Economic Inquiry, 56(3), 1464-1485, 2018.
Auctions with Selective Entry, with Matt Gentry and Tong Li, Games and Economic Behavior, 105, 104-111, 2017.
Monotone Equilibrium of Two-Bidder All-Pay Auctions Redux, with Sérgio O. Parreiras, Games and Economic Behavior, 104, 78-91, 2017.
Existence of Monotone Equilibrium in First Price Auctions with Private Risk Aversion and Private Initial Wealth, Games and Economic Behavior, with Matt Gentry and Tong Li, 2015, 94, 214-221.
Auctions with Selective Entry and Risk Averse Bidders: Theory and Evidence, with Tong Li and Li Zhao, RAND Journal of Economics, 2015, 46(3), 524-545.
Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities, with Qiang Fu and Qian Jiao, Economic Letters, 125(3), 2014, 376-380.
Optimal Auctions with Asymmetric Financial Externalities, Games and Economic Behavior, 74(2), 2012, 161-175.
Entry Coordination and Auction Design with Private Costs of Information-Acquisition, Economic Inquiry, 48(1), 2010, 274-289.
Why A Simple Second-Price Auction Induces Efficient Endogenous Entry, Theory and Decision, 66, 2009: 181-198.
Auction Design with Opportunity Cost, Economic Theory, 38(1), 2009: 73-103.
Estimating Risk Aversion Using Ascending and Sealed Bid Auctions: Application to Timber Data, with Isabelle Perrigne, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 23, 2008: 871-896.
Optimal Entry in Auctions with Valuation Discovery Costs, Applied Economics Research Bulletin, 2, no. 1 (Special Issue on Auctions) (2008): 22 -30.
II. Contests:
Willingness to fight on: Environmental quality in dynamic contests, with H. Liu and A. Salvo, Rand Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
Efficient Public Good Provision by Lotteries with Nonlinear Pricing, With Tracy Liu and Zhewei Wang, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2022, 204, 680-698.
Nested Tullock Contests with Nonmonotone Prizes, with Z. Wang and L. Zhou, International Journal of Game Theory, forthcoming.
Optimal Favoritism in Contests with Identity-Contingent Prizes, with Z. Wang and L. Zhou, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 196, 2022, 40-50.
Winner-leave versus loser-leave in multi-stage nested Tullock contests, with Y. Lu, Z. Wang and L. Zhou, Games and Economic Behavior, 132, 2022, 337-352.
On Equilibrium Player Ordering in Dynamic Team Contests, with Q. Fu, Economic Inquiry, 58(4), 1830-1844, 2020.
Task Arrangement in Team Competitions, with D. Lu, Economics Letters, 193, article 109329, 2020.
Enhancing Effort Supply with Prize-Augmenting Entry Fees: Theory and Experiments, with B. Hammond, B. Liu, and Y. E. Riyanto, International Economic Review, 60(3), 2019, 1063-1096.
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests with Costly Entry, with B. Liu, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 66, 2019, 137-161.
How to Split the Pie: Optimal Rewards in Dynamic Multi-Battle Competitions, with X. Feng, Journal of Public Economics, 160, 82-95, 2018.
Optimal Prize Allocation in Contests: the Role of Negative Prizes, With B. Liu, R. Wang and J. Zhang, Journal of Economic Theory, 175, 291-317, 2018.
Ranking Disclosure Policies in All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information, with Hongkun Ma and Zhe Wang, Economic Inquiry, 56(3), 1464-1485, 2018.
Monotone Equilibrium of Two-Bidder All-Pay Auctions Redux, with Sérgio O. Parreiras, Games and Economic Behavior, 104, 78-91, 2017.
Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Two-Player Asymmetric Tullock Contests with Intermediate Discriminatory Power, with Xin Feng, Economics Letters, 159, 61-64, 2017.
Optimal Contest Design under Reverse-Lottery Technology, with Bo Shen and Zhewei Wang, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 72, 25-35, 2017.
Optimal Prize Rationing in All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information, with Xuyuan Liu, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 50, 57-90, 2016.
Axiomatization of Reverse Nested Lottery Contests, with Zhewei Wang, Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, 547, 939-957.
The Optimal Disclosure Policy in Contests with Stochastic Entry: A Bayesian Persuasion Perspective, with Feng Xin, Economics Letters, 147, 103-107, 2016.
Team contests with multiple pairwise battles, with Qiang Fu and Yue Pan, American Economic Review, 2015, 105(7), 2120-40.
Axiomatizing Multi-Prize Nested Lottery Contests: A Complete and Strict Ranking Perspective, with Zhewei Wang, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2015, 116, 127-141.
On Disclosure Policy in Tullock Contests with Asymmetric Entry, with Qiang Fu and Jun Zhang, Canadian Journal of Economics, 49(1), 2016.
Contests with Endogenous Entry, with Qiang Fu and Qian Jiao, International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, 44(2), 387-424.
The Effort-Maximizing Contest with Heterogeneous Prizes, with Xuyuan Liu, Economics Letters, 125(3), 2014, 422-425.
Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities, with Qiang Fu and Qian Jiao, Economic Letters, 125(3), 2014, 376-380.
'Reverse' Nested Lottery Contests, with Qiang Fu and Zhewei Wang, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 50, 2014, 128-140.
Competitive Effect of Cross-shareholdings in All-Pay Auctions with Complete Information, with Qiang Fu, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 31(3), 2013, 267-277.
Incentivizing R&D: Prize or Subsidies?, with Qiang Fu and Yuanzhu Lu, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 30(1), 2012, 67-79.
Micro Foundations for Generalized Multi-Prize Contest: A Noisy Ranking Perspective, with Qiang Fu, Social Choice and Welfare, 38(3), 2012, 497-517.
Optimal Multi-Stage Contest, with Qiang Fu, Economic Theory, 51(2), 2012, 351-382, Reviewed by NAJ Economics.
On Disclosure Policy in Contests with Stochastic Entry, with Qiang Fu, Qian Jiao, Public Choice, 148(3), 2011, 419-434.
Contest Design and Optimal Endogenous Entry, with Qiang Fu, Economic Inquiry, 48(1), 2010, 80-88.
Contest with Pre-Contest Investment, with Qiang Fu, Economics Letters, 103(3), 2009, 142-145.
The Beauty of `Bigness': on Optimal Design of Multi Winner Contests, with Qiang Fu, Games and Economic Behavior, 66, 2009,146-161.
III. Mechanism Design:
Sequential Screening with Type-Enhancing Investment, with B. Liu, AEJ: Micro, 14(4), 25-57, 2022.
Optimal Selling Mechanisms with Buyer Price Search, with Z. Wang, Journal of Economic Theory, 196, 2021, 105307.
Orchestrating Information Acquisition, with L. Ye and X. Feng, AEJ: Micro, 13(4), 420-465, 2021.
Shifting Supports in Esö and Szentes (2007), with B. Liu and D. Liu, Economics Letters, 193, article 109251, 2020.
Ex Ante Efficient Mechanism with Private Entry Costs, with X. Feng and Y. Sun, Economic Inquiry, 58(3), 2020, 1531-1541.
Pairing Provision Price and Default Remedy: Optimal Two-Stage Procurement with Hidden R&D Efficiency, with B. Liu, Rand Journal of Economics, 49(3), 619-655, 2018.
Optimal Prize Allocation in Contests: the Role of Negative Prizes, With B. Liu, R. Wang and J. Zhang, Journal of Economic Theory, 175, 291-317, 2018.
Efficient and Optimal Mechanisms with Private Information Acquisition Costs, with Lixin Ye, Journal of Economic Theory, 148(1), 2013, 393-408.
Optimal Auctions with Asymmetric Financial Externalities, Games and Economic Behavior, 74(2), 2012, 161-175.
Entry Coordination and Auction Design with Private Costs of Information-Acquisition, Economic Inquiry, 48(1), 2010, 274-289.
Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good with Voluntary Participation, with Euston Quah, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 11(3), 2009, 343-362.
Why A Simple Second-Price Auction Induces Efficient Endogenous Entry, Theory and Decision, 66, 2009: 181-198.
Auction Design with Opportunity Cost, Economic Theory, 38(1), 2009: 73-103.
Optimal Entry in Auctions with Valuation Discovery Costs, Applied Economics Research Bulletin, 2, no. 1 (Special Issue on Auctions) (2008): 22 -30.
Other Topics:
Measuring the Degree of Assortative Mating, with Haoming Liu, Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 317-322, 2006.
Deposit Requirements in Auctions, with X. Che, T. Li, and X. Zheng, AEJ: Micro, 14(4), 465-493, 2022.
Perfect Bidder Collusion through Bribe and Request, with Z. Lu and C. Riis, Games and Economic Behavior, 129, 2021, 1-14.
Ex Ante Efficient Mechanism with Private Entry Costs, with X. Feng and Y. Sun, Economic Inquiry, 58(3), 2020, 1531-1541.
Pairing Provision Price and Default Remedy: Optimal Two-Stage Procurement with Hidden R&D Efficiency, with B. Liu, Rand Journal of Economics, 49(3), 619-655, 2018.
Ranking Disclosure Policies in All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information, with Hongkun Ma and Zhe Wang, Economic Inquiry, 56(3), 1464-1485, 2018.
Auctions with Selective Entry, with Matt Gentry and Tong Li, Games and Economic Behavior, 105, 104-111, 2017.
Monotone Equilibrium of Two-Bidder All-Pay Auctions Redux, with Sérgio O. Parreiras, Games and Economic Behavior, 104, 78-91, 2017.
Existence of Monotone Equilibrium in First Price Auctions with Private Risk Aversion and Private Initial Wealth, Games and Economic Behavior, with Matt Gentry and Tong Li, 2015, 94, 214-221.
Auctions with Selective Entry and Risk Averse Bidders: Theory and Evidence, with Tong Li and Li Zhao, RAND Journal of Economics, 2015, 46(3), 524-545.
Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities, with Qiang Fu and Qian Jiao, Economic Letters, 125(3), 2014, 376-380.
Optimal Auctions with Asymmetric Financial Externalities, Games and Economic Behavior, 74(2), 2012, 161-175.
Entry Coordination and Auction Design with Private Costs of Information-Acquisition, Economic Inquiry, 48(1), 2010, 274-289.
Why A Simple Second-Price Auction Induces Efficient Endogenous Entry, Theory and Decision, 66, 2009: 181-198.
Auction Design with Opportunity Cost, Economic Theory, 38(1), 2009: 73-103.
Estimating Risk Aversion Using Ascending and Sealed Bid Auctions: Application to Timber Data, with Isabelle Perrigne, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 23, 2008: 871-896.
Optimal Entry in Auctions with Valuation Discovery Costs, Applied Economics Research Bulletin, 2, no. 1 (Special Issue on Auctions) (2008): 22 -30.
II. Contests:
Willingness to fight on: Environmental quality in dynamic contests, with H. Liu and A. Salvo, Rand Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
Efficient Public Good Provision by Lotteries with Nonlinear Pricing, With Tracy Liu and Zhewei Wang, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2022, 204, 680-698.
Nested Tullock Contests with Nonmonotone Prizes, with Z. Wang and L. Zhou, International Journal of Game Theory, forthcoming.
Optimal Favoritism in Contests with Identity-Contingent Prizes, with Z. Wang and L. Zhou, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 196, 2022, 40-50.
Winner-leave versus loser-leave in multi-stage nested Tullock contests, with Y. Lu, Z. Wang and L. Zhou, Games and Economic Behavior, 132, 2022, 337-352.
On Equilibrium Player Ordering in Dynamic Team Contests, with Q. Fu, Economic Inquiry, 58(4), 1830-1844, 2020.
Task Arrangement in Team Competitions, with D. Lu, Economics Letters, 193, article 109329, 2020.
Enhancing Effort Supply with Prize-Augmenting Entry Fees: Theory and Experiments, with B. Hammond, B. Liu, and Y. E. Riyanto, International Economic Review, 60(3), 2019, 1063-1096.
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests with Costly Entry, with B. Liu, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 66, 2019, 137-161.
How to Split the Pie: Optimal Rewards in Dynamic Multi-Battle Competitions, with X. Feng, Journal of Public Economics, 160, 82-95, 2018.
Optimal Prize Allocation in Contests: the Role of Negative Prizes, With B. Liu, R. Wang and J. Zhang, Journal of Economic Theory, 175, 291-317, 2018.
Ranking Disclosure Policies in All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information, with Hongkun Ma and Zhe Wang, Economic Inquiry, 56(3), 1464-1485, 2018.
Monotone Equilibrium of Two-Bidder All-Pay Auctions Redux, with Sérgio O. Parreiras, Games and Economic Behavior, 104, 78-91, 2017.
Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Two-Player Asymmetric Tullock Contests with Intermediate Discriminatory Power, with Xin Feng, Economics Letters, 159, 61-64, 2017.
Optimal Contest Design under Reverse-Lottery Technology, with Bo Shen and Zhewei Wang, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 72, 25-35, 2017.
Optimal Prize Rationing in All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information, with Xuyuan Liu, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 50, 57-90, 2016.
Axiomatization of Reverse Nested Lottery Contests, with Zhewei Wang, Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, 547, 939-957.
The Optimal Disclosure Policy in Contests with Stochastic Entry: A Bayesian Persuasion Perspective, with Feng Xin, Economics Letters, 147, 103-107, 2016.
Team contests with multiple pairwise battles, with Qiang Fu and Yue Pan, American Economic Review, 2015, 105(7), 2120-40.
Axiomatizing Multi-Prize Nested Lottery Contests: A Complete and Strict Ranking Perspective, with Zhewei Wang, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2015, 116, 127-141.
On Disclosure Policy in Tullock Contests with Asymmetric Entry, with Qiang Fu and Jun Zhang, Canadian Journal of Economics, 49(1), 2016.
Contests with Endogenous Entry, with Qiang Fu and Qian Jiao, International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, 44(2), 387-424.
The Effort-Maximizing Contest with Heterogeneous Prizes, with Xuyuan Liu, Economics Letters, 125(3), 2014, 422-425.
Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities, with Qiang Fu and Qian Jiao, Economic Letters, 125(3), 2014, 376-380.
'Reverse' Nested Lottery Contests, with Qiang Fu and Zhewei Wang, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 50, 2014, 128-140.
Competitive Effect of Cross-shareholdings in All-Pay Auctions with Complete Information, with Qiang Fu, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 31(3), 2013, 267-277.
Incentivizing R&D: Prize or Subsidies?, with Qiang Fu and Yuanzhu Lu, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 30(1), 2012, 67-79.
Micro Foundations for Generalized Multi-Prize Contest: A Noisy Ranking Perspective, with Qiang Fu, Social Choice and Welfare, 38(3), 2012, 497-517.
Optimal Multi-Stage Contest, with Qiang Fu, Economic Theory, 51(2), 2012, 351-382, Reviewed by NAJ Economics.
On Disclosure Policy in Contests with Stochastic Entry, with Qiang Fu, Qian Jiao, Public Choice, 148(3), 2011, 419-434.
Contest Design and Optimal Endogenous Entry, with Qiang Fu, Economic Inquiry, 48(1), 2010, 80-88.
Contest with Pre-Contest Investment, with Qiang Fu, Economics Letters, 103(3), 2009, 142-145.
The Beauty of `Bigness': on Optimal Design of Multi Winner Contests, with Qiang Fu, Games and Economic Behavior, 66, 2009,146-161.
III. Mechanism Design:
Sequential Screening with Type-Enhancing Investment, with B. Liu, AEJ: Micro, 14(4), 25-57, 2022.
Optimal Selling Mechanisms with Buyer Price Search, with Z. Wang, Journal of Economic Theory, 196, 2021, 105307.
Orchestrating Information Acquisition, with L. Ye and X. Feng, AEJ: Micro, 13(4), 420-465, 2021.
Shifting Supports in Esö and Szentes (2007), with B. Liu and D. Liu, Economics Letters, 193, article 109251, 2020.
Ex Ante Efficient Mechanism with Private Entry Costs, with X. Feng and Y. Sun, Economic Inquiry, 58(3), 2020, 1531-1541.
Pairing Provision Price and Default Remedy: Optimal Two-Stage Procurement with Hidden R&D Efficiency, with B. Liu, Rand Journal of Economics, 49(3), 619-655, 2018.
Optimal Prize Allocation in Contests: the Role of Negative Prizes, With B. Liu, R. Wang and J. Zhang, Journal of Economic Theory, 175, 291-317, 2018.
Efficient and Optimal Mechanisms with Private Information Acquisition Costs, with Lixin Ye, Journal of Economic Theory, 148(1), 2013, 393-408.
Optimal Auctions with Asymmetric Financial Externalities, Games and Economic Behavior, 74(2), 2012, 161-175.
Entry Coordination and Auction Design with Private Costs of Information-Acquisition, Economic Inquiry, 48(1), 2010, 274-289.
Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good with Voluntary Participation, with Euston Quah, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 11(3), 2009, 343-362.
Why A Simple Second-Price Auction Induces Efficient Endogenous Entry, Theory and Decision, 66, 2009: 181-198.
Auction Design with Opportunity Cost, Economic Theory, 38(1), 2009: 73-103.
Optimal Entry in Auctions with Valuation Discovery Costs, Applied Economics Research Bulletin, 2, no. 1 (Special Issue on Auctions) (2008): 22 -30.
Other Topics:
Measuring the Degree of Assortative Mating, with Haoming Liu, Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 317-322, 2006.
Working Papers
Identification and Estimations in First-Price Auctions with Risk-Averse Bidders and Selective Entry, with Xiaohong Chen, Matt Gentry and Tong Li, R&R at Review of Economic Studies.
Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank order contests, with Bin Liu.
Optimal Team Contest Design, with Xin Feng, Qian Jiao and Zhonghong Kuang.
To Bundle or Not To Bundle: Incentivizing Multiple Competitions, with Bo Shen and Zhewei Wang
Auction Design with Shortlisting when value discovery is covert, with Murali Agastya, Xin Feng.
Stochastic Private Values in Auctions: Identification and Estimation.
